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Abstract: This paper introduces and formalizes the classical view on supply
and demand, which, we argue, has an integrity independent and distinct
from the neoclassical theory. Demand and supply, before the marginal revolution, are defined not by an unobservable criterion such as a utility function, but by an observable monetary variable, the reservation price: the
buyer’s (maximum) willingness to pay (WTP) value (a potential price) and
the seller’s (minimum) willingness to accept (WTA) value (a potential price)
at the marketplace. Market demand and supply are the cumulative distribution of the buyers’ and sellers’ reservation prices, respectively. This WTPWTA classical view of supply and demand formed the means whereby market participants were motivated in experimental economics although experimentalists (trained in neoclassical economics) were not cognizant of
their link to the past. On this foundation was erected a vast literature on
the rules of trading for a host of institutions, modern and ancient. This paper documents textually this reappraisal of classical economics and then
formalizes it mathematically. A follow-up paper will articulate a theory of
market price formation rooted in this classical view on supply and demand
and in experimental findings on market behavior.
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Introduction

This paper introduces and formalizes the classical view on supply and demand, which, we argue, has an integrity independent and distinct from the
neoclassical theory. The new school, as is well-known, replaced the old in
the 1870s through a widespread acceptance of constrained utility maximization as a core principle of economics.1 Yet a century later, utility maximization is proven to have no interesting implication for aggregate (market)
demand behavior, not even the law of demand except under artificial, restrictive conditions. While this major aggregation problem of standard price
theory (the ‘anything goes’ or SMD theorem2) is often simply if unintentionally evaded in most applied models through the representative-consumer
simplification (Hildenbrand, 1983; Grandmont, 1987), or by falling back on
some additive utility structure or other forms of cardinality (Arrow, 1986;
A. Kirman, 1989; A. P. Kirman, 1992), a few mathematical economists explored a pathway out of it, which consists of investigating the law of market
demand as a collective regularity holding by integration over the distribution of consumers’ preferences or incomes, thus turning aggregation into
the solution, rather than the problem, of the law of market demand: for
example, income or wealth effects, which are the main issue in the arbitrariness of neoclassical market demand, can be shown to be well-behaved by
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aggregation over a diverse population of consumers (essentially by the law
of large numbers).3 Ironically, this is the way the law of demand was understood in classical economics; Marshall, for example, who—as further emphasized below (Section 2.1)—tried to revive the classical view on supply
and demand, makes it clear that his clause of constant marginal-utility of
wealth (oft-discussed but oft-misunderstood in modern commentaries) is
inconsequential on the aggregate of many consumers, poor and rich combined (Marshall, [1890] 1920, pp. 15-16, 83). More important for our objective here, the old school articulated a price discovery process which found
unexpected new meaning in experimental markets establishing their remarkable decentralized convergence properties; these properties were not
and could not be predicted by neoclassical modelling (Chamberlin, 1948; V.
L. Smith, 1962). The goal of this paper is to rehabilitate mathematically the
classical view on supply and demand. The classical view is easy to understand by opposition to the neoclassical one that replaced it, but which introduced into economics a series of mischievous innovations. For example,
it used to be taken for granted in economics that economic reality is discontinuous at the micro level: not only is economic decision (both demand and
supply behavior) binary (to buy or not to buy, to sell or not to sell is the
problem), but goods come in discrete units and their relations are binary;
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for example, a consumer choses between two substitutes, rather than substituting infinitesimal amounts of goods, which strictly speaking are empty
concepts. (For example: is an infinitesimal amount of a diamond still a diamond? Or even water?) While many of the marginalists were well aware of
this point through Cournot ([1838] 1897, p. 50), they nonetheless assume
that economic variables are smooth so as to use the tools of differential
calculus.
Moreover, individual demand and supply, before the marginal revolution,
are defined not by an unobservable criterion such as a utility function, but
by an observable monetary variable, the reservation price: the buyer’s
(maximum) willingness to pay (WTP) value (a potential price) and the
seller’s (minimum) willingness to accept (WTA) value (a potential price) at
the marketplace. The underlying concept in value theory, in other words,
used to be, not pleasure or satisfaction in consuming a good (which is experienced, or not, after the fact of purchase), but the consumer’s valuation
of a good, the maximum the consumer would be willing to pay for the good
given his expectation of the good’s usefulness. Market demand and supply
are simply the cumulative distribution of the buyers’ and sellers’ reservation prices, respectively. This WTP-WTA classical view of supply and demand formed the means whereby market participants were motivated in
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experimental economics although experimentalists (trained in neoclassical
economics) were not cognizant of their link to the past. On this foundation
was erected a vast literature on the rules of trading for a host of institutions,
modern and ancient. (Holt, in Kagel &Roth, 1995, pp. 360-377.)
Classical economics is not commonly viewed in these terms; rather it is often reduced to a simplistic supply-side, cost or labor theory of value, that
fails to explain even the basic water-diamond value paradox because it was
thought to be lacking the concept of marginal utility (a misunderstanding
and distraction; Inoua & Smith, 2020a). Therefore, we must briefly revisit
the old literature to document our interpretation and to frame the analysis
in Section 2, which derives the classical conception of supply and demand
progressively and heuristically from the classical literature. The second part
of this paper (Section 3-4) is a formal restatement of classical supply and
demand. Section 3 formulates mathematically the supply side of classical
economics and derives key propositions of classical value theory.4 Section 4
derives the less known demand side, with special attention to the foundation of classical demand theory, as it is made explicit in the French classical
literature following Adam Smith.
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2

The classical methodology

Overall, the classical economists adopted a methodology that can be summarized in three principles:
Principle 1: It is a realistic portrayal of a market economy based on astute
observation of individual behaviors and interaction in the marketplace.
Principle 2: It derives from the acute observations and facts about the economy’s deep emergent properties that are the collective unintended consequences of these latter, the results of human actions but not of human design.5
Principle 3: Supply and demand are classically given by an observable, operational, monetary value: the reservation price—the buyer’s maximum willingness to pay (WTP) and the seller’s minimum willingness to accept (WTA).
This paper, which is part of a general rehabilitation of classical economics,
deals more specifically with Principle 3, the classical conception of supply
and demand.6 It is thus situated within the authors’ overall rehabilitation
project: it emphasizes how supply and demand were viewed before the
marginal revolution. Alfred Marshall attempted to reconcile this old view of
supply and demand with the new-born marginalist school.
2.1 Marshall’s revival of a key principle
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Alfred Marshall’s ‘pairs of scissors’ image is often invoked in an oversimplification of the history of modern economics divided into three phases: from
the classical, supply-centered, cost or labor theory of value to the early
neoclassical demand-centered, marginal-utility theory of value, and to Marshall’s synthesis of these two one-sided views into a unified price theory,
which, allegedly, became the foundation of contemporary economics. Yet
Marshall actually holds a more subtle view of the history of economics: his
‘pairs of scissors’ metaphor was merely intended to put an end to an old,
essentially metaphysical, controversy over the ultimate cause of value—a
problem which consisted of deciding which one of the two, unanimously
recognized,7 basic causes of value, utility or cost, is the most primitive
cause. Marshall’s reading of the history of economics, at the time, is unique,
in that he most clearly recognized what was really at stake during the marginal revolution. Though he accepted diminishing marginal utility (DMU) as
central to value theory (making him a marginalist of course), yet he saw in
Jevons’s program a major setback from a core methodological principle of
classical economics, which is often overlooked in modern commentaries.
This principle consists of dealing, as regards individual economic decisions,
not with the ultimate psychological forces driving them, but operationally
with the monetary sacrifices that people make in order to satisfy them.
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Thus, the relevant concepts for demand theory, for example, are, not the
ultimate psychological motivations behind demand decisions (desire, want,
pleasure), which had defied any precise quantitative modeling, but the
money prices consumers are willing to pay in order to acquire the desired
goods. This most fundamental principle, is applied equally to the supply
side, and to market price theory more generally. Investigated from the
standpoint of people’s feelings, the value attached to an object reflects ultimately the desire of possessing it and the effort in producing it (an object,
in this sense, is valuable, the more it is desired, and the more difficult it is
to produce, in terms of toil and trouble)8. But investigated from the standpoint of the monetary values (or prices) traders in a market are willing to
pay in order to produce or consume a good, the market price simply balances the ordered set of higher values that buyers are willing to pay to possess the good, with the ordered set of lower values that sellers are willing
to accept in order to produce it. This, as textually documented below (Section 2.2), was precisely how supply and demand were understood long before the marginal revolution.
Alfred Marshall, perceptively recognizing this classical methodology, credited its discovery to Adam Smith, whom he viewed as having launched an
epoch in the history of economics when he built from this principle a value
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theory that unifies all of economics “by a clearer insight into the balancing
and weighing, by means of money, of the desire for the possession of a
thing on the one hand, and on the other of all the various efforts and selfdenials which directly and indirectly contribute towards making it. Important as had been the steps that others had taken in this direction, the
advance made by him was so great that he really opened out this new point
of view, and by so doing made an epoch.” ([1890] 1920, Appendix B, p. 759).
It is in fact this principle for measuring motives that confers upon economics a special quantitative nature among the social sciences ([1890] 1920,
Book I, Ch. II, p. 12). Thus, in reaction to the hedonistic marginal utilitarianism of Jevons and Walras, who make pleasure the fundamental motivating
category of economics, Marshall reformulates it operationally—as did the
classicists (and, as it was applied, unknowingly, in the first market experiments)—entirely in terms of WTP and WTA (or demand-price and supplyprice, as Marshall calls them, because he wanted to relate that difference
to the incentive for seller entry)9. This WTP-WTA approach to supply and
demand frames value theory throughout the classical literature; we first
emphasize the demand side, since it is the less known.
2.2 Classical demand and French contributions
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The demand side of classical price theory is sketched in Adam Smith’s Lectures on Jurisprudence ([1763] 1869), under ‘Cheapness and Plenty’, which
prefigures the Wealth of Nations ([1776] 1904). In the magnum opus, he
simply grants that the purpose and foundation of consumer demand is to
satisfy need, and he expresses demand in terms of WTP. He then directly
explains price formation from the competition (higgling and bargaining)
among the sellers and buyers in a market (Ch. VII of Book I).
Adam Smith did not articulate demand theory in a systematic, explicit, and
formal way; but this articulation, which will be made explicit later by his
disciples, can be sketched simply. Utility, or the capacity of a good to satisfy
a consumer’s need, is classically treated, not in the abstract, but in the specific sense of use-value: the value that a person attaches to an object by
virtue of this object’s usefulness and measured by what the person is willing
to pay to get the object. Demand being thus founded on use-value, and usevalue being operationally WTP, Adam Smith, throughout Wealth of Nations,
equates demand directly to ‘those who are willing to pay’ a price. Elaborating on his work, the other classical economists also recognized explicitly
WTP as the relevant concept in classical demand theory. Malthus, for example, announced early in his Principles that ‘demand will be represented
and measured by the sacrifice in money which the demanders are willing
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and able to make in order to satisfy their wants.’ (Malthus, [1820] 1836, p
62)
The systematic and formal presentation of this classical demand theory appears in the important yet often overlooked French contribution to classical
value theory, notably the works of Germain Garnier, Jean-Baptiste Say, Augustin Cournot, and Jules Dupuit, but also the Italian Pellegrino Rossi, who
succeeded J.-B. Say at College de France’s economics chair.10 We see and
interpret the French classical literature as a substantive rather than a mere
echo, or popularization, of British classical economics; nor do we see it as
detached from the classical school and interpreted as an anticipation of
marginal-utility theory. Cournot, firmly in the classical stream, can be said
to have charted new directions, notably on supply theory, which prepared
the ground for the transition to neoclassical economics (though Cournot’s
views are more nuanced than its interpretations)11. Jules Dupuit, refining an
intuition of J.-B. Say, clarified that use-value corresponds more precisely,
not to any WTP, but to maximum WTP reservation price. J.S. Mill reached
the same conclusion, putting it more technically: ‘Value in use […] is the
extreme limit of value in exchange.’ Or: ‘the utility of a thing in the estimation of the purchaser, is the extreme limit of its exchange value [the maximum price the purchaser would be willing to pay].’ (Mill [1848] 1909, bk. 3:
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chap. 1, sec. 2; chap. 2, sec. 1.) Although no classical economist stated it
explicitly, a consumer’s demand follows by definition of the consumer’s valuation: willingness to buy any unit whose value is greater than the price.
This basic inequality, as formally emphasized in Section 4, defines entirely
the market demand function, which is simply the total number of units that
are valued more than the price offered: namely the complementary distribution function of consumers’ values.
As to the foundation of classical demand, namely the determinants of WTP
itself, it is not utility in the absolute, but a mix of utility and wealth. Need,
unlike wealth, is a primitive demand concept.12 Consumers buy goods to
satisfy a list of needs: to each need is associated a certain good (or collection of goods) that satisfies it. A consumer’s demand decision is shaped by
a pyramid or hierarchy of needs, a ranking of needs from the most urgent
to the least urgent: broadly speaking, from necessities, conveniences, to
luxuries and fancies.13
This hierarchy of needs is the fundamental principle of classical demand theory, as shown with great clarity by J.-B. Say ([1828] 2010, p. 368) and as
recognized by Dupuit (1849, p. 15), quoting Rossi’s exposition ([1840] 1865,
Lesson 5, pp. 87-88). The hierarchy of needs is partly objective, even uni-
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versal. Thus, no good is valued higher than water, which serves a vital biological need; a diamond, serving an ornamental need, is valued lower, since
one would be willing to give all diamonds at hand to survive. Yet the market
prices for a cup of water and a diamond (or their objective exchange values)
are inversely related to their subjective valuations—a paradox which is
long-known to be solved by the concept of scarcity, and which no classical
economist regarded as an unsolved mystery (Inoua & Smith, 2020a). But
the hierarchy of needs is in part subjective as well. At any rate, the economist takes a consumer’s needs as given.
In summary, the classical value literature from Adam Smith to Jules Dupuit
offers a consistent picture of demand, which Marshall attempted to reconcile with the newborn marginal school.14
2.3 Classical cost and supply decision
Cournot, who beautifully expounds the old view on demand in one fascinating paragraph ([1838] 1897, p. 50), goes on, however, to introduce an
abstract theory of atomistic profit-maximizing firms—which will become
the standard view on supply in the hands of the marginalists. Like utility
maximization, profit maximization thus conceived raises decision problems
that actual firms hardly face; for example, it leads to an ill-defined supply
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function when marginal cost is nonincreasing (most manufactured products?)15 or zero (information products such as software programs). The
basic problem lies in the definition of the firm’s production possibility set
as an unbounded set: thus, a firm facing a constant unit cost, for example,
would be willing to supply an infinite amount of output when facing a price
greater than the unit cost. Consider in contrast an actual firm under the
same cost condition: granted that the firm’s maximum production capacity
is finite, its supply decision is obvious: willing to supply every producible
unit at any price greater than the unit cost.
Prior to Cournot’s innovation, the discussion on supply decision seems to
presume none other than the basic principle, taken for granted, of willingness to supply whenever it is profitable to do so, that is, at any price beyond
a minimum acceptable price (the minimum WTA). Like classical demand,
classical supply is not explicitly and formally defined; yet it goes without
saying, by definition of the concept of minimum price, which corresponds
to the cost of production, or more precisely the cost of supplying the commodity to the market. Classical cost is the monetary evaluation of all the
sacrifices the producer makes in order to supply the commodity, including
the expectation of a minimum profit compensation (without which none
would engage in the toil and trouble of producing). Regarding this monetary
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cost valuation, Adam Smith, and this is crucial, assumes none other than
the actual practice of firms in their cost accounting: not only the obvious
part, wages and the cost of raw materials (determined by market rates), but
also the monetary estimate of the use of fixed capital (allowance for depreciation), and the producer’s minimum compensation, which is a subjective
evaluation in general; but would expect at least the ‘ordinary profit’ in the
industry. Adam Smith, who particularly emphasizes this actual practice of
firms on many occasions, faces none of the technical complications of later
authors who will treat capital as a physical agent of production (the aggregation problem as it applies to fixed capital).16 Granted the cost valuation
(a monetary evaluation of all expenses of production), which is the producer’s minimum WTA, the producer is willing to supply any unit at a price
that covers at least the money cost: willingness to sell any unit whose cost
is lower than the price. This inequality, as emphasized below, defines entirely the supply function: since market supply is the number of units that
can be supplied profitably, it is given by the cumulative distribution function
of the unit costs.
2.4 Limitations of Marshall’s synthesis
Marshall’s insightful attempt to revive the classical method does not pay
full justice to the old paradigm, due to his desire to integrate neoclassical
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utility theory into his treatment. For example, he defines the demand function as the surplus-maximizing quantity of a representative consumer that
hypothetically buy by infinitesimal increments of the commodity, and he
founded the law of demand on diminishing marginal WTP (or ‘demand
price’); he defines supply similarly. This and other neoclassical imports play
no essential role in the classical formulation, and none when Marshall is
brought to a description of price formation in a local country market. [Marshall ([1890] 1920, Book V, Chap. II) simply reverts to a WTP/WTA description of “higgling and bargaining” as we find it in A. Smith ([1776] 1904, Book
I, Ch. VII).]
Marshall ([1890] 1920, p. 64) acknowledges that economic reality is discontinuous in regard not only to the quantity of goods but also of individual
behavior, but demand is smoothed, “in so far as the motives of that action
are measurable by a money price; and in these broad results the variety
and the fickleness of individual action are merged in the comparatively
regular aggregate of the action of many”; a form of the law of large numbers. The motivation for this theoretical procedure is this other equally important principle of classical methodology noted in the introduction,
which Cournot expressed in a most fascinating way ([1838] 1897, p. 50),
and which consists more generally of investigating economic regularities

17

as collective regularities emerging by aggregation over agents. For the
classical economists, this meant aggregation over the distribution of
agents’ characteristics, and not just a hypothetical average agent, as Marshall did.
Finally, we have Marshall’s deviation from the old school in regards to his
dealing with wealth effects through his oft-discussed clause of constant
marginal utility of wealth, which may be erroneously interpreted to mean
that thinking in terms of reservation price is a narrow case of the utilityfunction view; though Marshall in fact goes on to argue that variations in
marginal utility of wealth, like the discontinuities of demand with respect
to price variations, are of no significance on the aggregate of many consumers, with poor and rich, young and old combined (Marshall, [1890] 1920,
pp. 15-16, 83). Space forbids to elaborate further on Marshall’s synthesis.
Rather this paper concerns the restoration of the old school, on its own
merits, bereft of Marshall’s attempted synthesis.
3

Supply

3.1 The market supply function
Consider a market economy in which n goods and services (including labor
services) are traded at market prices p

[ p1,..., pn ]. A producer in any market

is willing to sell any unit that can be produced profitably. Consider a given
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commodity, which we single out by not indexing it. In terms of cost, each
unit of a commodity produced is characterized by the number of inputs
from other commodities its production required, which we denote generically as a vector17 a

[a1,..., an ], and the input prices. Thus, the cost of a unit

of a commodity is
c

k

ak pk

ap.

(1)

Different units clearly may cost differently to produce since they may involve a different mix [a, p]. The producer would be willing to sell any unit at
a price p

c. The function that associates to any price vector the total num-

ber of units of that commodity that would be supplied, at this price vector,
by all the producers in the market is, by definition, the market supply function. It is by construction the cumulative distribution function of unit costs,
which is a non-decreasing step function of the market price, ceteris paribus:
S (a, p)

where by definition F (a, p)

(c

SF (a, p),
p) and S

(2)
S (a,

) is the total (maximum)

supply capacity in the market (the total number of units that can be supplied, which would be fully supplied were the market price infinite); for a
particular market, the distribution in question refers to the collection of all
units of the same commodity.
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Figure 1: Market supply is the cumulative distribution of unit costs.
The prices of inputs assumed fixed here: their changes corresponding
to shifts of the supply curve.

The relevant unit of analysis in supply theory is the supply for a unit of a
commodity: S j (p)

1 if c j

p, and S j (p)

0, otherwise. The supply of a firm

is simply is a list of such elementary supplies: it is entirely specified by the
number of units the firm can produce and the corresponding list of costs for
each unit.
3.2 The labor theory of value
Unlike Ricardo (and his followers), Adam Smith mentioned only passingly
the labor theory of value which applies only in rude societies:
“In that early and rude state of society which precedes both the
accumulation of stock and the appropriation of land, the proportion
between the quantities of labour necessary for acquiring different
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objects seems to be the only circumstance which can afford any rule
for exchanging them for one another. If among a nation of hunters…it usually costs twice the labour to kill a beaver which it does to
kill a deer, one beaver should naturally exchange for or be worth
two deer…the produce of two days or two hours labour, should be
worth double…the produce of one day's or one hour's labour.18
(Smith, [1976] 1904, p. 49)
Ricardo himself makes it clear that the labor theory of value applies only
when goods can be produced with homogenous labor, in abundant
amounts, and at proportional costs (which excludes the complications of
the diversity of fixed capital that Ricardo would later deal with); Ricardo
later concedes that quantity of labor is the dominant (not the sole determinant) of price, at least in the long run. Both J.-B. Say and Malthus oppose
Ricardo even regarding long-run value, which, as they point out, is determined by both supply and demand. Although historically Ricardo is perhaps
the most influential of the classical economists, it is a mistake to view Ricardo’s formulation as a culmination of this school of thought; it is not true
upon scrutiny that Ricardo was resolving inconsistencies in Adam Smith’s
view; Ricardo was dealing with technical complications (the diversity of la-
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bor and fixed capital) that are precisely the reason why Adam Smith mentions only passingly labor theory of value and goes on to develop (Book I,
Ch. VII) the general theory of market price formation. For example, Ricardo
deals with the diversity of labor following Adam Smith’s view that wage differentials are determined by the ‘higgling and bargaining’ of the market;
but this is precisely why the relevant price theory in general is a theory of
supply and demand. While this point is now commonplace in economics,
yet Adam Smith in most commentaries on classicalism is overshadowed by
Ricardo; and the classical school is still commonly reduced to the labor theory of value, although much of the controversies that opposed Ricardo to
both Say and Malthus pertains precisely to Ricardo’s reduction of this
school of thought and his downplaying the role of demand in price theory.
Let it be reminded that the labor theory of value is equivalent to assuming
a Leontief price system, as known since the influential revival of Ricardo’s
theory by Sraffa (1960); see Inoua and Smith (2020a).
4

Demand

4.1 The market demand function
For a given commodity, let hk

1 if a consumer considers commodity k is

more urgent than the commodity under consideration, and hk
wise; let h

0, other-

[h1,..., hn ] . Consumers differ in terms of hierarchy of needs h
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and wealth w. Let the distribution of these consumers’ attributes be referred
to as [h, w ] . A unit of a commodity will be demanded by a consumer if the
money left out of his wealth, once more urgent needs are considered, can
afford the unit: that is, if (w

k

hk pk )

p. Thus the consumer’s valuation of

the commodity, as given by his maximum WTP for it (reservation price) is
v

w

k

hk pk

w

hp.

The consumer would be willing to buy every unit whose v

(3)
p. The market

demand function at any price is therefore the number of units of the good
to which consumers attach a greater value than the price: it is by construction the complementary distribution function of the consumers’ reservation prices, which is a non-increasing step function of price, ceteris paribus,
which we write generically:
D(h, w, p)

where G(h, w, p)

(v

p) and D

DG(h, w, p),

(4)

D(h, w, 0) is the total (maximum) number

of units of the good that consumers need (their overall demand were the
market price zero).
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Figure 2: Market demand is the complementary distribution
function of consumers’ valuations (or reservation prices).

4.2 Remarks on a few conceptual distinctions
Quantity: needed versus demanded versus bought
The focus on the elementary demand for a unit of a good irrespective of the
identity of the demander, is on purpose, as unit demand is the relevant unit
of analysis. The total demand of a consumer is merely a list of unit demands:
it is entirely specified by the number of units the consumer needs and their
reservation prices. Let di

di (hi ,W , p) be the consumer’s demand function

for commodity i. The demand (resp. supply) function, be it reminded, indicates the quantity the consumer would demand were the consumer facing
any arbitrary price p . The total quantity needed is di

di (hi ,W , 0). 19 It is a

different concept from the quantity the consumer succeeded to actually
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buy, which depends on the extent of competition in the market. The distinction more generally between quantity demanded or supplied (willingness to trade) and the quantity actually traded is of utmost importance: serious paradoxes and conceptual obstacles in the neoclassical theory of price
formation can be shown to be due to failure to acknowledge explicitly actual trades as a conceptually district notion from a supply and demand function, which summarize all willingness to buy and sell at any possible price;
since Walras, for example, it is common to treat supply and demand as if
always fulfilled into actual trades, which would be the case only in equilibrium.
Complements and substitutes
Realistically, the relationship among commodities are binary. Consider two
commodities i and k viewed from the consumer’s viewpoint. By definition,
the two goods are complementary if they jointly serve the same need, and
hence are jointly demanded: di

0 implies dk

0, and vice versa. They are

substitutes if they serve the same need, but interchangeably, so that demand for one excludes demand for the other: di

0 implies dk

0, and vice

versa. In both cases, demand for one good derives logically from demand
for the other: theoretically, therefore, all substitutes, on the one hand, and
all complements, on the other, can be treated mathematically as forming
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one class of goods, of which knowledge of one element is like knowledge of
the whole. Thus, we are left with the hierarchical relation among goods as
the essential notion in demand decision: good i is more urgent than good
k

if di

0 implies dk

0.

4.3 The pyramidal model of market demand
The law of demand and the law of supply, as we saw (Figure 1 and Figure
2), hold by construction, in the sense that market demand and market supply are, respectively, nonincreasing and nondecreasing (step) functions of
price, ceteris paribus. This weak version of the two laws is all that the theory
of price formation requires in general (Inoua & Smith, 2020b). But stronger
versions can also be derived under minimum assumptions, as the French
classical20 economists emphasize; we derive them formally now.
For partial-equilibrium purposes, let wealth distribution and the prices of
related goods be given. In a sufficiently large market, as Cournot beautifully
emphasized ([1838] 1897, p. 50), market demand (resp. market supply) can
be assumed to be a smoothly decreasing (increasing) function of price. A
large market can be formally defined as an idealized version of a market
that involves a sufficiently large number of distinct values and costs modeled by continuous density functions supported on continuums. Formally, a
large market is therefore one for which the distribution of costs and values
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are modeled by the continuous density functions F ' and

G'

supported on

the intervals [cmin , cmax ] and [vmin , vmax ] respectively, over which the density
functions are strictly positive by definition. It then follows by construction
S/ p

SF '(p)

0 and D / p

DG '(p)

0 on the respective supports.

Now, consider a market in isolation, setting hp
G(h, w, p)

G(p)

(w

0 in (3), so that v

w and

p), so that market demand is given by the distribu-

tion of wealth across consumers, which Garnier, Say, and Dupuit represented as a pyramid (Figure 3), whose top represents the wealthy minority
and whose base represents the poor majority: more generally, the pyramid
represents the distribution, not of wealth per se, but of the portion of
wealth each consumer would be willing to pay for the commodity (Garnier,
[1796] 1846, pp. 195-196; Say, [1828] 2010, p. 370, footnote 1). The pyramidal assumption in formal and general terms simply means a decreasing
probability density of wealth or WTP more generally, G ''

0, so that mar-

ket demand is a convex function of price, as Dupuit insightfully observed
(1844, pp. 367-368). Unlike the law of demand proper, however, this convexity property, sometimes referred to as Dupuit’s second ‘law’ of demand
(Ekelund Jr & Thornton, 1991; Humphrey, 1992 )21, is true only to the extent
that the pyramidal assumption is true: it is not essential to price theory.
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Figure 3: Pyramidal model of market demand (Garnier, Say, Dupuit). The pyramid (left) represents the distribution in society of wealth (top=the wealthiest,
bottom=the poorest), or more precisely the distribution of consumers’ WTP.
Market demand, at each price, is measured by the cross-sectional area of the
pyramid corresponding to the price. If price is zero, all consumers can afford the
good; as price increases, a lower and lower fraction of society can afford the
good; and beyond some maximum value (125), none can afford the good.

Figure 4: Triangular market demand model (2-dimensional version the pyramidal model): market demand is the length of the segment XY: it is a linear function (as can be proven from elementary geometry). The pyramidal market demand (3-dimentiomal) is simply the square of this triangular market demand.

For illustration, assume (following Garnier, Say, and Dupuit) a square pyramid (Figure 3): then market demand is simply the square of its two-dimensional image (Figure 4), obtained by reducing the pyramid to a triangle, and
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the cross-sectional areas of the pyramid to segment lengths. It can be
shown from elementary geometry [Thales’s (intercept) and Pythagoras’s
theorems] that
G (p )

D (p )
D(0)

XY
BC

v max
v max

p

.

(5)

This corresponds to a uniform probability distribution of consumers’ reservation prices supported on [0, vmax ]. [The extension to the general case
[vmin , vmax ] is straightforward: G (p)

(v max

p)/(v max

v min ). ] The two-dimen-

sional, pyramidal, model yields (assuming again a square pyramid)
G (p )

v
p 2
( max
v max ) ,

(6)

which is indeed a (strictly) convex demand function. It should be insisted
that the law of demand, even in its smooth version, holds for any continuous probability distribution of consumer valuations; it is only the secondary,
convexity, property that requires the pyramidal assumption G ''

0. 22

Although this probabilistic view on demand (based on the distribution of
consumers, as ranked in different orders of society based on WTP, or, as we
would say today, in different statistical classes), was first formalized in the
French literature, it was in fact implicit throughout the classical school: thus
Adam Smith was implicitly treating consumers in that way when, for exam-

29

ple, he observed in his Lectures that ‘everything is dearer or cheaper according as it is the purchase of a higher or lower set of people’ (A. Smith,
[1763] 1869, p. 177).
5

Conclusion

The classical economists mostly adopted the same realistic view of the market economy; not that they concurred to it by an explicit a priori methodological commitment; but, rather, they concurred to it because they were
essentially adopting the same mentalizing process, which consists, first of
all, of carefully observing everyday economic life, and then deriving from
this acute observation, deep emergent regularities that are unintended
consequences of these ordinary individual behaviors and interactions. J.-B.
Say explained this classical methodology with great clarity in his Cours complet (and complained that Ricardo at times deviated from it).23
But in place of this realistic methodology, the early neoclassical economists
substituted a-priori axiomatic theorizing, whereby a theorist starts beforehand with a set of axioms (for example: pleasure explains every move in
human behavior) and from these abstract premises, constructs through a
chain of formal deductions an imaginary economy (often populated by a
single player: Robinson Crusoe); and even after the axioms have proved,
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upon more scrutiny, to be empirically empty by the barrenness of their implications, the as-if theorist finds further refuge in fiction, and an excuse for
holding onto these axioms. Thus, price-taking behavior, for example, was
recognized from the very beginning to be a dead end as a premise for a
theory of competitive market price formation (for if everyone in the economy takes price as given, where do these prices come from in the first
place?) Yet in the face of this dead end, an early evasion simply assumed a
perfect market in which supply and demand and the consequent equilibrium price are perfect knowledge to every trader beforehand (Jevons,
[1871] 1888). A second, now-standard, escape consists of simply postulating the existence of a fictional auctioneer who seeks all equilibrium prices
by trial and error (Walras, [1874] 1954).24 In the same spirit, the aggregation
problem of neoclassical demand is evaded through the representative-consumer assumption.
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1

In the standard undergraduate intermediate theory course the consumer
chooses units (x1, x2) of goods defined on a continuous commodity space
to Max U (x1, x2) [increasing and concave in (x1, x2)] subject to I = p1x1 +
p2x2, given (U, I, p1, p2). Every aspect of this model is contrary to the classical economic model, wherein: (1) the consumer chooses only discrete
units of goods [the primary meaningful application to continuous action
spaces is in finance]; (2) if income is fixed and constrains choice, wealth is
stationery, but the classical economists saw as their end and purpose to
inquire as to the nature and causes of the wealth of nations; (3) prices and
income were to be determined in the market, and were not given to it; (4)
U was a hidden variable to the classics, but people in markets revealed that
they had willingness to pay demand valuations for goods, and for inputs to
supply goods, and these were central to their analysis.
2

That is, the Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu theorem (Sonnenschein, 1972,
1973a, 1973b; Debreu, 1974; Mantel, 1974; Shafer & Sonnenschein, 1993;
Rizvi, 2006).
3

This abstract revival of the law of demand as an aggregate regularity, systematically explored in Hildebrand (1994), can be viewed as part of the general ‘regularity by aggregation’ literature, which seeks to solve the multiple
indeterminacy of neoclassical theory (e.g. the indeterminacy of demand
when preferences are non-convex). For an overview of this literature, see
Trockel (1984).
The probabilistic view on demand has in fact resurfaced in different other
forms even before the SMD crisis; for example, Becker’s intuition that even
impulsive or random consumer choice constrained by a budget would obey
the law of demand by aggregation, independently of utility maximization
(Becker, 1962); for a recent revival of this view, see (Shaikh, 2012); for a
recent experimental exploration in a general-equilibrium context, see
Crockett, Friedman, and Oprea (2019).
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4

Classical market price theory is not to be confounded with the labor theory
of value, on which Ricardo insisted, and which is a diversion from the general classical theory of price formation; the precise conditions under which
the labor value theory applies are restated in 3.2; for a formal derivation
see Inoua and Smith (2020a).
5
“[N]ations stumble upon establishments, which are indeed the result of
human action, but not the execution of any human design” (Ferguson,
1782, p 205)
6
A follow-up paper will present a theory of price formation that is rooted
in the classical view on competition and relates that view to experimental
findings on market behavior. Other more preliminary papers tackle obstacles and limitations of the classical literature, which may seriously impede
or even discourage the modern reader’s assessment of the old literature,
and explains the articulation of value theory in the classical school: the technical jargon of classical economics (natural price, monopoly price, effectual
demand); the endless classical controversies regarding essentially unsolvable, metaphysical, issues (the invariable measure of value and the ultimate
cause of value); these controversies can mislead the modern reader into
seeing irreconcilable divergences in the classical school (and whose unity
may thereby be questioned).
7

None of the protagonists of this old utility-versus-cost controversy denied
that market price is determined jointly by utility and cost: ‘Almost all writers
have agreed substantially, and have rightly agreed, in founding exchangeable value upon two elements, -power in the article valued to meet some
natural desire or some casual purpose of man [utility], in the first place, and,
in the second place, upon difficulty of attainment [cost]. These two elements must meet, must come into combination, before any value in exchange can be established.’ (De Quincey, 1844, p. 13).
8

Following the classical terminology, Marshall ([1890] 1920, p. 282) distinguishes between real cost (pain, effort, difficulty of producing a product)
from money cost (the monetary valuation of the real cost: the expenses of
production, including a minimum profit requirement). Today we take for
granted the fact that cost of production (difficulty of production) is meas-
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ured by the monetary sacrifices the producer makes (the expense of production). Yet this principle (which applies to the demand side as well) will
be adopted in the neoclassical school only as a shortcut or a concession,
Thus, Jevons’s program, a pure subjectivism, aimed at explaining value entirely in terms of pleasure (utility, demand) and its negation, pain or effort
(disutility of labor, supply).
9

Marshall explains this often-overlooked classical principle in a systematic
way throughout his famous Principles of Economics ([1890] 1920), particularly in Book I, Ch. II, and makes it clear that its paternity originates with
Adam Smith, and his “unsurpassed powers of observation”. Marshall did
not realize, however, that all the classical economists, as they followed in
Smith’s footsteps, reached the same conclusion, that value theory should
be founded on people’s monetary valuations. With hindsight, it was a major
editorial mistake on the part of Marshall to have moved the section on the
history of economics—in which he clearly explains the classical paternity of
this principle—to the Appendix, in response to the public demand for making the first parts of his book less tedious.
10

The references are G. Garnier ([1796] 1846, pp. 195-196); J.-B. Say (1803
[2006], vol. 2, bk. 2, chap. 1; [1828] 2010, vol. 1, part 3, chap. 4), particularly
the later book, the Cours complet, which synthetizes and extends the material covered in Say’s earlier books; P. Rossi ([1840] 1865, Vol. I, Lesson 5);
A. A. Cournot ([1838] 1897, chap. 4), and J. Dupuit (1844, 1849). Many of
the relevant passages of this French literature on demand and value are
quoted in (Ekelund Jr & Hébert, 1999).
11

On more of the methodological innovations of Cournot, see Smith and
Inoua (2019).
12

The classical concept of WTP is out of wealth, not income. The idea of
income as a constraint on commodity choice is conceptually a blatant neoclassical error. Modeling choice in the current period only makes static
sense if one of the goods is variable and constitutes saving—not consuming—with personal value in the current period; otherwise, the action set is
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not closed and part of the dynamics of wealth accumulation. For Adam
Smith that value is security, which he saw as protection against downside
loss: “We suffer more…when we fall from a better to a worse situation, than
we ever enjoy when we rise from a worse to a better. Security, therefore,
is the first and the principal object of prudence.” (Smith, 1759, p. 213)
13

More than a century later, A. Maslow (1943) offers a famous psychological theory of the pyramid of needs.
14
Marshall perhaps first noticed the classical methodology through his reading of Cournot and Dupuit, whose influences on him he acknowledged
([1890] 1920, p. 85, footnote 1). The remarkable thing is his seeing the connection with the classical school more generally and tracing its origin back
to Adam Smith.
15
It was common belief in the classical literature that most (manufactured)
goods are produced at constant or decreasing unit costs (production on a
large scale leads to efficiency gains because it promotes a better division of
labor, for example); only agricultural produce and mined resources were
believed to command increasing unit costs. See, for example, Mill ([1848]
1965, p. 464 ff.) Various modern surveys suggests that increasing marginal
costs are indeed exceptional in practice: it seems, according to one survey
of the US economy, that ‘only 11 percent of GDP is produced under conditions of rising marginal cost.’ (Blinder, Canetti, Lebow, & Rudd, 1998) For a
discussion of these issues with neoclassical supply theory, see Keen (2011,
Part I, Ch. 5).
16

This assessment of the producer’s minimum price through a realistic cost
valuation is clearly stated throughout Wealth of Nations, starting from Ch.
7 of Book I ([1776] 1904, p. 50). It is repeated countless times in specific
contexts. For example: ‘When any expensive machine is erected the extraordinary work to be performed by it before it is worn out, it must be
expected, will replace the capital laid out upon it, with at least the ordinary
profits.’ (p. 103) Or elsewhere: ‘The lowest price at which coals can be sold
for any considerable time, is, like that of all other commodities, the price
which is barely sufficient to replace, together with its ordinary profits, the
stock which must be employed in bringing them to market.’ (p. 168) This

40

view would appear throughout the classical literature. Marshall ( [1890]
1920, p. 299) also clarifies this cost valuation of firms.
17

More precisely a matrix with double entry, in more explicit notation; but
by fixing the commodity under study, the notation is simplified from distracting indices.
18
A source of confusion, perhaps, is the distinction between the labour theory of value and the concept of labour as a measure of value, developed by
Smith. Thus, “The value of any commodity…to the person who possesses it,
and who means not to use or consume it himself, but to exchange it for
other commodities, is equal to the quantity of labour which it enables him
to purchase or command. Labour, therefore, is the real measure of the exchangeable value of all commodities.” (Smith [1776, 1904, p 32)
19

Adam Smith introduces the distinction ‘absolute demand’ versus ‘effectual demand’ to reflect the nuance between quantity needed or desired and
quantity effectively demanded (determined by need, constrained by
wealth). An explanation of the technical classical jargon (absolute versus
effectual demand; natural versus monopoly price, etc.) can be found in
Inoua and Smith (2020a).
20

By now, there should be no reason for hesitating to refer to all of them
simply as classical economists.
21

Dupuit emphasized, besides the standard law of demand proper (as price
drops, quantity demanded increases), a so-called second ‘law’ (Ekelund Jr
& Thornton, 1991; Humphrey, 1992 ): the increase in demand due to a price
drop is the higher, the lower the initial price: that is, the second derivative
of the demand function is positive, which, as Dupuit justified intuitively, and
as formally proven in the text, derives from the pyramidal assumption.
22

This nuance is missing in the original literature, and understandably so,
since back then even the basic difference between continuity and differentiability (let alone probability density function versus cumulative probability
function) have yet to be well-understood, as Cournot’s characterization of
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continuity at one point in his book attests ([1838] 1897, p. 50, phrase
italicized).
23

J.-B. Say discusses the methodology underlying classical economics in the
opening Considerations générales of the Cours complet ([1828] 2010, pp. 361).
24

Walras merely set the stage for this fiction: the explicit introduction of
the imaginary auctioneer in the theory of tatonnement came later.

